[LallaAisha]

On a less global scale, the continued irresolution of the Western Sahara problem contributes to Morocco’s internal instability. Morocco has spent billions of dollars both in supplying tens of thousands of troops along a 1,200-mile berm to keep the Polisario out of the territory and in building and maintaining an infrastructure in a thus-far unsuccessful effort to win the hearts and minds of the remaining Sahrawi population. This drain on resources has exacerbated Morocco’s already-serious economic problems, encouraged dangerous ultranationalist demagoguery, strengthened the political role of the armed forces, and encouraged political repression, all of which contribute to political instability in this important country.

The Western Sahara standoff also constitutes the major obstacle to greater cooperation between the countries of northwestern Africa—known as the Maghreb—and has nearly triggered open warfare between Morocco and the neighboring states of Algeria and Mauritania. Such regional instability, particularly in light of the growing challenge of Islamic radicalism in the region, does not serve U.S. interests.

Meanwhile, U.S. insistence on economic liberalization in Morocco without concomitant political liberalization has only served to encourage political instability and the rise of radical anti-American movements. As in the Persian Gulf region, the United States—itself the product of a republican revolution—finds itself in the awkward position of defending an absolute monarchy against those who strive for a more democratic system. As with previous cases where the U.S. has identified itself with economic policies that disproportionately hurt the poor and with governments that are unpopular and autocratic, the likelihood that a successor regime will be strongly anti-American is greatly enhanced.



Toward a New Foreign Policy
Key Recommendations
The U.S. should pressure Morocco—possibly employing military and economic sanctions—to comply with UN Security Council resolutions and to proceed with a fair and internationally supervised referendum.
Closer diplomatic relations with the Polisario Front should be established as a means of strengthening the peace process.
The U.S. should encourage both political liberalization and efforts at sustainable and broad-based economic development in Morocco.
The Houston Agreement reiterates and strengthens the key aspects of the original UN settlement: refugee repatriation, troop confinement, release of prisoners, freedom to campaign, access for accredited international observers, equal access by the parties to the media, and UN authority to intervene to insure the fairness of the electoral process. The agreement’s definition of eligible voters appears to be much closer to the Polisario’s assumption of a legalistic territorial meaning than to Morocco’s rather vague ethnic referents. Whether it can actually be implemented remains to be seen.

Since there was an American presence in the thick of the negotiations, the Clinton administration did not feel a great need to interfere. At the same time, the administration did little to support Baker’s efforts. Although State Department and Defense Department officials privately hope for a fair referendum in Morocco’s favor, most realize that an unfair victory by Morocco would be highly problematic and would likely lead to a resumption of the fighting. As a result—unlike the Reagan administration in the 1980s—the U.S. has not tried to sabotage these peace efforts.

Whether the referendum will actually occur may depend on whether the Clinton administration is willing to take the leadership to insure that its Moroccan ally does not once again seek to delay and sabotage the peace process. There is some speculation that the Moroccans actually hope for open American pressure to help blunt the domestic reaction should the referendum not go in Morocco’s favor.

As was the case during the Bush administration, legislators are taking some initiative in the matter through an unusual coalition of liberal and conservative lawmakers from both parties. Congress has passed a resolution supporting a “free, fair, and transparent” referendum “held in the presence of international and domestic observers and international media without administrative or military pressure or interference” where “only genuine Sahrawis, as identified in the method agreed upon by both sides, will take part.” Lawmakers have furthermore requested that the Clinton administration fully support such a referendum process.

This is exactly the position the U.S. government needs to adopt. Washington must be willing to exhibit the same leadership it has shown in other international conflicts to insure that Morocco does not try to back out of the agreement. This might include the threat of military and economic sanctions against Morocco to insure compliance. The willingness of the United States to help guarantee the referendum process could be a litmus test for the credibility of U.S. diplomacy in North Africa and perhaps for the entire world.

A second policy shift that Washington should pursue is closer diplomatic ties with the Polisario Front. Soon after Morocco’s invasion, the Polisario declared an independent state of Western Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), which was subsequently recognized by 75 countries and is a full member of the Organization of African Unity. The U.S. has traditionally avoided close diplomatic contact with Polisario representatives and has pressured a number of countries to withhold recognition. Washington needs to recognize the Polisario as a legitimate actor in the conflict and must fully consider its perspectives in the ongoing peace process. Should Morocco continue to balk at proceeding with a fair referendum, the U.S. should consider establishing full diplomatic relations with the SADR.

Finally, involving Morocco itself, Washington needs to encourage a transition to a greater degree of democracy. Although a parliamentary system is in place, the king still remains an autocratic ruler. The U.S. should urge the release of political prisoners and should encourage a transition toward a more authentic and open democratic system. In addition, while continuing to endorse economic liberalization that challenges official corruption and dubious prestige projects, Washington needs greater sensitivity to the impact of other economic reforms on the large and growing poor segments of Moroccan society. Morocco’s economic growth in recent years has benefited primarily a small minority of the population. Only through a more even and sustainable development program can political and economic stability be enhanced.

Stephen Zunes is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco.



Sources for more information
Organizations
Africa Research Project
2627 Woodley Place NW
Washington, DC 20008
Voice: (202) 797-3608
Email: dvolman@igc.apc.org
Contact: Dan Volman

Defense Forum Foundation
3014 Castle Road
Falls Church, VA 22044
Voice: (703) 534-4313
Fax: (703) 538-6149
Email: skswm@aol.com
Contact: Suzanne Scholte

Human Rights Watch—Middle East
1522 K St. NW, Suite 910
Washington, DC 20005
Voice: (202) 371-6592
Fax: (202) 371-0124
Email: hrwdc@hrw.org

Sahara Fund
4438 Kendall St. NW
Washington, DC 20016
Voice: (202) 364-9473

Saharan People’s Support Committee
217 East Lehr Av.
Ada, OH 45810
Voice: (419) 634-3666
Contact: Anne Lippert

Publications
Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1983).

Yahia Zoubir & Daniel Volman, eds. International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

Stephen Zunes, “The U.S. and the Western Sahara Peace Process,” Middle East Policy, vol. V, no. 4, January 1998.

“Desert Dawn: War and Peace in Western Sahara,” special issue of The New Internationalist, no. 297 (Hertford, UK), December 1997.